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New Law School Building
On January 18, 1956, Chancellor Kimpton announced that
the Ford Foundation had granted $1,275,000 to the Uni­
versity of Chicago to aid in the construction of a new law
building, to provide funds for law fellowships, and for
expanded instruction in legislative drafting. The grant
provides $800,000 toward the estimated $3,500,000 con­
struction cost of the new Law School Building, which is
one of the objectives of the campaign for funds initiated
by the University last June. On page 2 of this issue of
the Record the Foreign Law Fellowships and the Law
Fellowships for Commonwealth Students, in aid of
which the Ford Foundation grant will be used, are dis­
cussed briefly. The Law Revision program, which will be
assisted also, was explained by 'Professor Dunham in the
Autumn issue of the Record.
The projected building has been designed by Eero
Saarinen and Associates, who are now consulting archi­
tects to the University for the physical development of
the entire campus. The building will be erected south of
the Midway, in the block bounded by Sixtieth Street on
the north, Sixty-first Street on the south, University Ave­
nue on the east, and Greenwood Avenue, recently closed
to traffic, on the west. It will thus occupy a site directly
between the new American Bar Center on the east and
Burton-Judson Courts, the University's newest and larg­
est Residence Halls, on the west. The new building will
have a direct physical linkage with Burton-Judson, in
which law students will be housed. The Law School
Building will consist of four wings, with purposes and
facilities as follows: (1) The Auditorium-Courtroom
Wing. This wing will contain a completely equipped
courtroom seating about 250, with appropriate satellite
rooms and an auditorium accommodating about 600.
Flexible dividers will make it possible to close off the
front portion of the auditorium should a very large class­
room be desired. (2) The Classroom-Seminar Room
Wing. This long, low wing will have a corridor running
along one side its full length. Students will go up one
Continued on page 5
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Professor Allen
New Appointment
The Law School is pleased to announce the appointment
of Francis A. Allen to be Professor of Law, effective July
1. Mr. Allen is currently professor of law at the Harvard
Law School.
Mr. Allen was graduated summa cum laude from Cor­
nell College in 1941. His legal education was secured at
the Law School of Northwestern University, from which
he was graduated in 1946 magna cum laude. He inter­
rupted his law-school training to serve for three years in
the Army Air Forces. During his Senior year in law
school he was editor-in-chief of the Illinois Law Review.
Upon graduation, Professor Allen was appointed law
clerk to Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, of the United States
Supreme Court, with whom he worked during the 1946
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and 1947 terms. In 1948 he was appointed to the faculty
of the Northwestern University Law School. He re­
mained at Northwestern until his appointment at Har­
vard in 1953, except for brief service as branch chief in the
Office of the Chief Counsel of the Wage Stabilization
Board and a stay at the University of Chicago Law School
as Visiting Professor for the Summer Quarter, 1955.
Professor Allen has served as a consultant to various
departments of the Illinois state government and as a
member of the board of governors of the Metropolitan
Housing and Planning Council of Chicago. He was
chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Illinois Sex
Offenders Commission in 1952-53. He is associate editor
of the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
Science. He has published widely in a variety of fields, al­
though his primary interests are in criminal law and con­
stitutional law.
Alumni and Faculty Notes
THE HONORABLE HARRY HERSHEY, JD'U, is now serving
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
The president of the Association of American Law
Schools, MAURICE T. VAN HECKE, of the University of
North Carolina, and the president-elect, PHILIP MECHEM,
of the University of Pennsylvania, are graduates of the
Law School. Professor Van Hecke is a member of the
Class of 1917; Professor Mechem, of the Class of 1926.
PROFESSOR HARRY KALVEN, JR., discussed the School's
Jury Project at a recent meeting of the Toledo Bar Asso­
ciation.
The School notes with regret the recent deaths of two
distinguished alumni. MR. WALTER HAMMOND, of Keno­
sha, Wisconsin, was graduated from the Law School in
1916, after taking his undergraduate degree from Beloit
College. He then entered upon the practice of law in
Kenosha, where he remained until his recent death. Mr.
Hammond, a member of Phi Alpha Delta, served as
president of the Kenosha County Bar Association and, in
1941-42, of the Bar Association of the State of Wisconsin.
He was also a director of the Kenosha Chamber of Com­
merce and was active in Kiwanis and in Boy Scout work.
MR. ARTHUR E. MITCHELL, JD'10, died recently in Knox­
ville, Tennessee. Mr. Mitchell received the Bachelor's de­
gree from Colorado College before coming to Chicago.
Subsequent to his graduation he entered practice in
Knoxville, which practice he maintained until his election
as Chancellor of the Knox County Court in 1934. He
served as Chancellor until his retirement in 1950, the
longest tenure in the history of the court. Mr. Mitchell
was for several years a member of the Knoxville School
Board, serving as its chairman in the difficult days of the
early 1930's. He was also a trustee of Maryville College,
which in 1947 awarded him the honorary degree of Doc­
tor of Laws.
International Legal Studies
In the course of its work in international legal studies,
The Law School has for many years conducted courses
and seminars in comparative law. The Max Pam Profes­
sorship of Comparative Law was established in 1935. As a
base for research in comparative law, the Comparative
Law Research Center was established in 1948. Under its
auspices the annotated translation of Max Webe'r's Law
in Society and Economy was published in 1954 and a
study on Conflict Law in American Treaties in 1956. A
major investigation into the relations between divorce
laws and marriage stability is nearing completion. Since
1949, the School has been- carrying on a special course of
introduction to American law for foreign students. It is
designed to take care of the needs of that steadily grow­
ing number of graduates of law schools of civil law coun­
tries who do not come to this country to prepare them­
selves for the practice of law in the United States. What
these students want is, in a one year's stay, to acquaint
themselves with the methods of common-law thought and
to obtain some knowledge of American law and institu­
tions. When back home, they will then utilize their
American experience in their work in their own laws and,
perhaps, also in the conduct of legal business between
their home countries and the United States. Students of
this kind are strangers to those institutions of American
social, economic, political, and cultural life which an
American student has absorbed simply by living here.
They are also unfamiliar with American university or­
ganization and American teaching methods. Many of
them are specially interested in some particular field of
American law such as trade regulations, corporation law,
or the treatment of juvenile delinquency, which they can­
not understand without some basic knowledge and train­
ing of a more general kind.
Such students are likely to waste all, or a considerable
part, of the short time they have in this country, unless
they receive understanding guidance as well as special
introductory instruction. At The University of Chicago
Law School the facilities offered to take care of these
needs have so far been used by some seventy students
coming from seventeen different countries.
In recent years a need has been recognized for Ameri­
can lawyers to acquaint themselves with the legal systems
of civil law countries, both for practical purposes and as a
method of enriching the understanding of American law,
its possibilities of development, and its teaching. If an
American law graduate goes abroad to study law in, let
us say, Paris, he is likely to be as much at sea as the for­
eign law graduate here unless he is specially prepared and
guided. To provide such preparation and guidance, the
School now offers a Foreign Law Program, which ex­
tends over twenty-one months, the first nine months to
be spent in residence at the University and the following
twelve months in a foreign country.
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During the first nine months the major portion of the
student's working time will be spent in intensive and sys­
tematic study of the private law of France or Germany.
These two systems have been chosen because a mastery of
either one will enable a student to work effectively in any
one of the many laws which are based upon the French
or German models, such as those of Belgium, the Nether­
lands, Italy, Spain, and Latin America, of Austria, Swit­
zerland, Japan, and Turkey. He will also be prepared to
approach the private law systems of the Nordic countries
and of many of the Arabic countries, of Eastern Europe
and of Southeast Asia.
The remainder of the first-year curriculum will be flex­
ible, but students who do not have a decided preference
for any particular field of private law will be advised to
devote their attention to the law of international trade
and international business transactions. Insofar as neces­
sary, the student will also have to advance his proficiency
in the language of the country of his choice.
The work of the second year will be carried on in that
foreign country for which the student has been prepared.
Before the student goes abroad, arrangements will have
been made for his continued guidance by a law teacher in
the country chosen, who, in consultation with The Uni­
versity of Chicago Law School, will prepare for each stu­
dent an appropriate plan of studies and research and who
will be available through the year as counselor and con­
sultant. In suitable cases provision may be made for prac­
tical training in a law office, a government agency, or a
business firm.
Thus prepared and guided, the student should be in a
position to gain the most from his work abroad and,
quite particularly, to avoid that waste of time and effort
which otherwise appear to be inevitable.
A student who has successfully completed the full pro­
gram will be awarded the degree of Master of Compara­
tive Law (M.Comp.L.). Upon the acceptance by the fac­
ulty of a major study as a thesis, the candidate will be
awarded the degree of Doctor of Comparative Law (D.
Comp.L.). In order to be accepted as a thesis, the study
must constitute an original contribution to legal learning.
Financial assistance through the award of a fellowship
or tuition scholarship may be given to students of emi­
nently high qualification. Fellowships will cover tuition
and other fees, the, cost of travel, and a monthly living
stipend of $180 or the equivalent of its purchasing power
in the country in which the second year of the program is
spent.
In a further effort to enrich its work in international
legal studies, the School has decided also to offer a limited
number of fellowships to graduates of law schools in
countries within the British Commonwealth. The train­
ing w'hich such students receive in the American variant
of the common law should help them in their work at
home and strengthen the ties within the common-law
part of the world. Through their representing a diversity
of background and interest, they also should exercise a
stimulating influence among the student body of the
School.
The year at Chicago may be taken either upon the
completion of university studies or after a period in prac­
tice, government service, or teaching. The Fellows from
the Commonwealth will be admitted to the regular un­
dergraduate curriculum of the School and pursue the pro­
gram of studies which is taken by students who are pre­
paring themselves for admission to the bar and practice in
the United States. The Fellows will normally be admit­
ted to the Senior Class when they enter and may, there­
fore, complete the program and qualify for the J.D. de­
gree during one year of residence at the School.
The stipends for the Fellows will be $3,000 for residents
of the United Kingdom; $3,500 for residents of Africa,
Australia, New Zealand; and $2,500 for residents of
the Dominion of Canada. It is expected that these
amounts, which reflect differences in travel expenses, will
be adequate to cover the expenses, including tuition fees
and living expenses, of a nine-month academic year at the
Law School.
The Fellowships will be awarded by the Faculty of the
School from a group of candidates from the Common­
wealth, each of whom will have been selected by his uni­
versity and designated to compete for the Fellowship as a
representative of that university.
Some of the numerous publications by The Law School
faculty are contained on these shelves in the Law Library.
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Review of Katz, "Introduction
to Accounting"
The following review is reprinted from the Journal of Legal
Education, Volume 8, Number 2, with the permission of the
author and of the Editors of the Journal. Mr. Katz is James
Parker Hall Professor of Law at the University of Chicago
Law School and was a pioneer in the introduction of ac­
counting to the law-school curriculum.
INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING. By Wilber G. Katz. Chi­
cago: Callaghan & Company, 1954.
Courses in accounting have become as much a part of
the permanent law school curriculum as those familiar
stalwarts: contracts, torts, property, and criminal law.
They were once timidly inserted by reluctant curricu­
lum committees into the course schedule as one-hour
electives, usually taught by an instructor borrowed from
the business school or from among local practitioners.
Now, however, accounting has become a fixture in the
law school curriculum, usually required of the degree
candidate who has little or no accounting in his under­
graduate work. Most faculties feel that accounting prob­
lems are so inextricably intertwined in many matters
encountered in present-day law practice that a study of
the subject is as necessary an ingredient in the training
of the practical lawyer as courses in trial tactics, brief
writing, legal drafting, and others.
In presenting accounting to the student who has had
no training or experience in the field, the instructor has
the problem of how much time to spend on the funda­
mentals of bookkeeping as contrasted with the more im­
portant problems of financial statement analysis, presen­
tation of data concerning corporate net worth, and other
matters which concern management and counsel for
management. As a matter of pedagogy, some are dis­
posed to teach accounting by the case method, using
judicial interpretations of corporation and tax statutes as
they pertain to accounting with supplementary explana­
tory matter. Others prefer to present the subject as it is
taught in business schools: text reading, illustrative ma­
terials, and problems. Professor Katz's approach is the
latter method, and it is done effectively in this latest text
on a subject with which he has had considerable teach­
ing experience. The student who has had no exposure
to accounting must start with fundamentals. Deferred
charges, depreciation reserves, and capital and earned
surplus are all meaningless terms on financial statements
unless the student understands the basic accounting proc­
ess by which debits and credits to these accounts are
journalized, posted, recorded in ledger accounts, and fi­
nally are reflected in summary form at the end of the
accounting period in financial statements.
The first four chapters concern the fundamentals of
the accounting process. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction
to financial statements, the end product of the account­
ing process. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the rudiments
of bookkeeping and the accounts used in the double en­
try system. In Chapters 5 and 6, the author inserts ma­
terials on accumulation and discount computations and
bond premium and discount tables. These chapters,
which concern materials of a special nature that are en­
countered relatively infrequently in the average practice,
could be omitted by the instructor without losing the
continuity of the presentation of subject matter. Chapters
7 and 8 take up in detail two bugbears for the beginner­
inventories and depreciation-with a discussion of dif­
ferent theories with respect to these matters. In Chapters
9 through 12, the author discusses corporate proprietor­
ship: issuance of shares, dividends, capital readj ustments,
treasury stock, and earned and capital surplus. These are
the chapters that are so necessary to the student in the
corporation law course, and the author suggests that they
may be omitted, as they are at the University of Chicago
Law School, and taken up in the corporation law course
itself. Chapter 13, on partnership accounting, is of par­
ticular significance with the extensive codification of the
treatment of partnerships for federal income tax pur­
poses under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Chapter
14 takes up the problems of normal versus unusual items
of operating income and their presentation in accounting
statements. Chapter 15, on intangibles, and Chapter
16, on intercorporate stock holding and consolidated
statements, concern special problems of importance with
which the student should be familiar. Finally, in Chapter
17, the author comes full circle to financial statements,
the subject with which he started in Chapter 1. Here the
technique of comparative analysis and ratios is presented.
This is important for the student since he must realize
how masses of data are collected and presented on finan­
cial statements which are not only a formal summation
of historical events, but tools which management can use
to project more efficient and effective operations into the
future.
The text quotes from materials of the American Insti­
tute of Accountants, the American Accounting Associa­
tion, and S.E.C. releases. References are also made to
corporation and tax cases and standard accounting texts.
A minimum of problems is inserted throughout the book
to enable the student, by these exercises, to understand in
a practical way the principles discussed. The text is suit­
able for a one-hour course; or if additional materials
such as prospectuses, corporate annual reports, and as­
signed reading in footnote and reference materials are
used, the text is appropriate for a two-hour course.
CHARLES O. GALVIN
Professor of Law
Southern Methodist University School of Law
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Looking south from the Midway, the Auditorium-Courtroom Wing is out of the picture on the lett, the Classroom-Seminar
Room Wing is at the extreme left, the Library-Office Wing is in the center, the small Administration-Legal Aid Wing is im­
mediately to the right of the Library, and Burton-Judson Residence Halls are on the right of the picture.
New Building-
Continued from page 1
flight from this corridor to reach four classrooms, varying
in capacity from 85 to 170, and down one flight to five
seminar rooms, accommodating 18 to 43 students, and to
the student locker area. (3) The Library-Office Wing.
This central, seven-story structure will have storage and
mechanical facilities on the ground floor. On the first
floor will be located an exhibition area and a student
lounge. The presence of a small warming kitchen will
make it possible to use this flexible space for the luncheon
and dinner sessions of the Law School conferences and
similar gatherings. The second floor will contain the
Reading Room of the Law Library, together with the ad­
ministrative offices of the Library, the offices of the Law
Review, a Special Collections Room, and a Rare-Book
Room. The third floor will be a balcony overlooking the
Reading Room, occupied largely by stacks and study
areas. The fourth through the sixth floors will duplicate
the arrangement of the mezzanine floor of the present
building, a central core of stacks surrounded by a ring of
Faculty and research offices. Interspersed among the
stacks will be a number of carrells for student work. (4)
The Administration-Legal Aid Wing. This wing will
contain a suite of offices for the administrative activities
of the School, together with ample space for legal aid.
The building is designed to accommodate a senior
teaching faculty of forty or more, about sixty research as­
sociates, fellows, graduate students, and visiting scholars,
and an undergraduate student body of about 450. There
will be stack space for 300,000 books, with provision made
for the addition of necessary stack floors at minimum ex­
pense. The building will connect with Burton-Judson
Courts, which will make available student housing facili­
ties, lounges, dining halls, and private dining rooms.
Continued on page 19
Top drawing shows a view of the Classroom-Seminar Room
Wing looking east from Burton-Judson Courts. Bottom
sketch depicts the interior of the Exhibition Area and Student
Lounge to be located on the main floor of the central Library­
Office Wing of the new building.
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A plan of the entire site, with Sixty-first Street at the top of the picture. The new American Bar Center is on the left, BU1'­
ton-Judson Residence Halls, the newest and finest the University has, on the right, and the projected new Law Building
between.
Architect's sketch at left shows the interior of a medium-sized
Seminar Room. Drawing above indicates seating arrange­
ments in a large Seminar Room.
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Sketch shows the interior of a large classroom. Plans call for four classrooms, varyzng in capacity from 85 to 170
MECHANICAL STORAGE
STUDENT BAR MIMEO LEGAL AID
SEMINAR· 20 SEAT S
SEMINAR· 43 SEAT S
SEMINAR· 25 SEAT S
SEMINAR· 25 SEATS
LOCKERS
t=l==
Plan tor the ground floor of the new Law Building. The seminar rooms and student locker areas are in the wing on the left;
mechanical and storage space and stacks in the center; and the legal aid offices and student bar association on the right.
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Top sketch depicts a typical research office and
right, a typical faculty office. The sketch below
shows the general layout planned for the Read­
ing Room of the Law Library.
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CARRELLS
MICROFILM SMOKING
LlBRAR 8 FFICES
CLASSROOMS ADMINISTRATION
CLASSROOM I�O SEATS
CLASSROOM 170 SEATS
RESIDENCE HALLS
AUDITORIUM CLASS ROOMS LIBRARY 8 OFFICES ADMINISTRATION RESIDENCE HALLS
FACULTY OFFICES
RESEARCH OFFICES
RESEARCH OFFICES
F ACUL TY OFFICES
S TACK- MECHANICAL FLOOR TYPICAL STACK FLOOR BALCONY
At top: plan for main floor of the new Law Building. Below: top sketch shows a cross-section view of the principal parts of the
building, and bottom, plans of three typical floors of seven-story central library structure.
10 The Law School Record Vol. 5� No.2
The new Law Building as it will appear on its site. On the ld
consisting of, from left to right, the Auditoriurn-Courtroom
'
Wing, and the Administration-Legal Aid Wing; on the right, J
Vol. 5, No.2 The University of Chicago Law School 11
;ft, the American Bar Center; in the center, the Law Building,
Wing, the Classroom-Seminar Room Wing, the Library-Office
Burton-Judson Residence Halls.
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AUDITORIUM
475 SEATS MOOT COURT
175 SEATS
Floor plans and a cross-section view of the Auditorium-Moot Court Wing of the new Law Building. Drawing in lower left is a
view of the interior of the Auditorium.
Drawing at left shows the interior of the Courtroom and sketch at right is of the Special Collections Room, adjoining the Read­
ing Room of the Law Library.
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Psychoanalysis and Law
By WILBER G. KATZ
(lames Parker Hall Professor of Law)
How may one characterize the relation between the dis­
ciplines of psychoanalysis and law or, rather, the relation
between representative members of the two professions?
It will not do to say simply that it is a relation of friendly
co-operation or one of hostile suspicion. Perhaps the usual
relation may fairly be called one of mutual ambivalence.
The analyst, on the one hand, regards the maintenance of
a system of law and justice as a necessary condition for
personal. equilibrium. On the other hand, he regards
much of the law as antiquated and outworn and often
criticizes it as based on theological and moral ideas which
have survived their usefulness. From their side, the men
of law sometimes welcome the insights into human moti­
vation which psychoanalysis has contributed. At other
times lawyers show hostile defensiveness in the face of the
analysts' sweeping criticisms of the law.
Psychoanalysts have sometimes spoken of the law in
terms which seem calculated to increase this defensive­
ness. Thus in a book which we may take as representative
of the psychoanalytic tradition, Dr. Franz Alexander be­
gins one chapter with a brisk resolution boldly to "enter
the Augean stables of philosophy of law and attempt to
make a psychological analysis of the concept of responsi­
bility."!
As this quotation suggests, the principal focus of ten­
sion between psychoanalysis and law is the general con­
cept of responsibility. Legal tradition asserts, or at least
assumes, that most men have some measure of free choice.
Psychoanalysis, on the other hand (to quote Alexander
again), "considers the human psychic apparatus as a sys­
tem which is fully, and without a single gap, determined
by psychological and biological causative factors."2 He
adds his diagnosis that the concept of free will is an illu­
sion-"an expression of the narcissistic wish, or even the
postulate of the moralists that the Super-Ego does or
should rule, supreme and unlimited in the psychic appa­
ratus of man.... "
Ten years ago an American Bar Association committee
warned that careful consideration must be given to the
spread of Freudian doctrine.
So far as your committee can discover, ... the doctrines of
psychoanalysis tend toward determinism; free will does not
exist but human conduct is or may be determined ... by long
past events in the life of the individual. ...
3
The committee added a vague threat:
Unless there is a reversal in the trend of the development
and exploitation of psychoanalysis ... , the C?u:ts w,ill be
called on sooner or later to determine whether It IS or IS not
an established science or art to justify the admission of
testimony of psychoanalysts .
(It is not recorded that analysts were thrown into a panic
by this pronouncement.)
A general treatment of the relation of psychoanalysis
and law would have to deal with many points of contact.
In this paper, however, I shall consider only certain prob­
lems related to the concept of responsibility.
In the 1920's Dr. Alexander worked closely with a Ber­
lin criminal lawyer, Hugo Staub. They wrote a book
which was published in this country in 1931 under the
title The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public-a Psycho­
logical Analysis. This book is still one of the most pene­
trating interpretations of criminal behavior. In the next
few pages I shall attempt a highly condensed summary of
this analysis, realizing, of course, that I can hardly expect
to avoid inaccuracy.
Criminality is not a congenital defect; it results from
defective training; it shows arrested development. We all
go through a period of infantile criminality. (The au­
thors invite us to imagine what the world would be like
if predominance of power were in the hands of children
under ten.) A majority of children learn not to be crimi­
nals through the experience of punishment-punishment
from the physical world itself and from parents (and
others) through the infliction of pain or the apparent
withdrawal of love. This experience of the demands of
reality leads to repression of part of the basic drives and
to the discovery of socially acceptable outlets for the re­
mainder. The result is an unstable equilibrium, "a sort of
a contract between the powers which restrict our instinc­
tual expression and the instinctual demands of the indi­
vidual." Criminal behavior results from the blocking of
this process or from the precarious nature of this equilib­
num.
Alexander distinguishes four principal categories of
criminals. The first consists of psychotics and defectives
in whom criminal acts are traceable to organic degenera­
tion or failure of organic development. The second cate­
gory is that of "neurotic criminals." The third he calls
"normal criminals," professional criminals without psy­
chological conflict. These three categories are those of
"chronic" criminals. The fourth includes those who have
committed crimes not because of a general criminal tend­
ency but because of the external pressure of an acute sit­
uation.
These four categories of crime are distinguished ac­
cording to the degree and character of the ego participa­
tion which they involve. In the case of psychotics and
defectives, ego participation is entirely absent. Among
neurotic criminals, however, there is variety in the degree
and mode of ego participation. One must distinguish
those with specific neurotic symptom patterns from those
with general neurotic characters. Persons with specific
neurotic symptoms enact and re-enact an unconscious
drama of crime and self-inflicted punishment. Klepto-
Continued on page 15
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Professor Dawson delivering the first lecture of the series
Professor Tefft with Mr. and Mrs. Robert McDougal, lD'29,
at the Quadrangle Club on the occasion of Professor Daw­
son's opening lecture.
Dawson Lectures
During the Winter Quarter, The Law School sponsored
a series of three lectures by Professor John P. Dawson,
of the University of Michigan Law School, on the subject
of "State Control of the Judging Function." A reception
and dinner prior to each of the lectures afforded an
opportunity for friends of the School to meet Professor
Dawson, who was a visiting Professor at The Law School
during the academic year 1954-55.
Professor Mentschikoff, Alfred Whital Stern, and Professor
Dawson at the reception preceding his first lecture.
Breasted Hall during Professor Dawson's lecture
Fred C. Ash, '40, Mrs. Ash, Mrs. Robert Crowe, Robert
Crowe, '49, and Professor Blum at the reception preceding
one of Professor Dawson's lectures.
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mania and pyromania afford illustrations of such neu­
rotic symptoms. Here the action is compulsive; ego par­
ticipation is almost zero. In the case of general neurotic
characters, however, the ego assents to the overt conduct,
but there is usually no awareness of the subjective mean­
ing of the conduct, and mechanisms such as rationaliza­
tion and projection are typically involved. This category
includes not only many law-abiding eccentrics but also a
large proportion of criminals. Often psychoanalysis can
reveal clearly that the unconscious motivation is one of
seeking punishment.
In the case of normal (professional) criminals, Alex­
ander finds a "criminal Super-Ego"; the criminal is with­
out unconscious conflict, but his adj ustment is to the
law-breaking section of the community. In his conduct
there is relatively full ego participation. The same is true
of the acute or "situational" criminal; here the circum­
stances faced are so painful that the individual feels re­
leased from the "bargain" which normally keeps his be­
havior within the law.
Alexander and Staub's analysis covers not only the con­
duct of criminals but also the social demand for their
punishment. In the first place, the demand for punish­
ment is seen as a defensive reaction to the threat which
the criminal presents. The threat is twofold. Externally,
of course, crime is' a threat to safety and order and is met
by defensive force. But even more significant is the in­
ternal threat to the normally law-abiding citizen.
The example of the criminal has a stimulating effect on
our own repressed impulses, and increases the pressure com­
ing from them....4
The demand that every crime should be expiated repre­
sents, then, a defense reaction on the part of the Ego against
one's own instinctual drives; the Ego puts itself at the service
of the inner repressing forces, in order to retain the state of
equilibrium, which must always exist between the repressed
and the repressing forces of the personality.P
In both of these ways the demand that crime be pun­
ished is defensive. It must be added, however, that the
demand may also represent an outbreak of basic hatred
and aggressiveness.
Other analysts might charge Dr. Alexander with over­
simplification and might question his four categories. For
our purposes, however, we may take the foregoing as a
typical psychoanalytic view of the behavior of criminals
and of the social reaction to such behavior. What does
such a view imply as to the purposes of the criminal law ?
It implies, in the first place, that the criminal law is
exclusively forward-looking. Penalties should be imposed
only in order to influence behavior-either the future be­
havior of the criminal himself or the behavior of others
for whom his punishment serves as an example. The
criminal law should in no sense be retributory. The crim-
inal's act was fully determined; he could not have
avoided acting as he did. The notion of expiation or ret­
ribution is entirely inadmissible.
If penalties are viewed as imposed to influence the be­
havior of the criminals themselves, what are the implica­
tions of the classification of criminals outlined above? In
the case of both psychotic and neurotic criminals, pun­
ishment will not have the desired effect. In such charac­
ters criminal conduct is not deterred by the threat of
punishment. In many cases, in fact, the threat of punish­
ment is an inducement, since the unconscious motivation
is that of desire for punishment. The other two classes,
the professional and the "situational" criminals, consist of
those whose acts are characterized by ego participation.
They are therefore more or less deterable. As to the acute
or "situational" crime, however, Alexander states that
"punishment ... is superfluous." He is skeptical as to the
effect of actual punishment upon professional criminals,
but he insists that these "will have to be isolated, or made
socially safe in some other way, throughout the course of
the period during which they remain a menace to soci­
ety.?"
Much more important, from the viewpoint of psycho­
analysis, is the deterrence of others as a justification of
the criminal law. According to Alexander, "the majority
of people resist some of their own tendencies toward anti­
social behavior, not because of moral qualms, but because
of fear of real consequences.... The laws forbidding the
murder of parents, incest and cannibalism ... are almost
the only laws which man, in general, obeys without po­
lice supervision."? In the words of Dr. Ranyard West,
"In our law-making it is our own control which we are
planning rather than that of others.:" From this view­
point the criminal law is an outstanding success.
This summary of the psychoanalytic view of the func­
tion of the criminal law suggests that a working agree­
ment is possible between the lawyer and the analyst, not­
withstanding their apparent disagreement as to retribu­
tion and free will. They should, be able to agree that in­
dividuals who are in general deterable (those in whose
conduct a high degree of ego participation is manifested)
are to be held responsible as if their acts sprang from free
choice. As to the mentally ill, neurotic criminals as well
as psychotics, it is inappropriate to treat them in the same
fashion-and it is unnecessary in order to maintain the
general deterrent force of the law. To the extent that
"normal" citizens sense that such persons are psychologi­
cally different, their being treated as sick rather than as
criminals should accord with the sense of justice. This
assumes, of course, that dangerous persons who are thus
held irresponsible will be segregated with such opportu­
nity for therapy as the state can make available.
For some lawyers acceptance of this working agree­
ment should be relatively easy. Some lawyers take a de­
terminist view of human conduct and regard punishment
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as a mere use of the criminal to deter others. Thus .Mr.
Justice Holmes wrote in a letter to Laski:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was
going to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don't
doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it
more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the
common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying
for your country if you like. But the law must keep its
promises.P
In general, however, lawyers have balked at any such
working agreement with psychiatrists. The typical law­
yer, like the typical citizen, assumes that legal responsi­
bility is related to moral responsibility and that moral
responsibility presupposes freedom of choice. Judges and
legislators (at least in Anglo-American countries) have
hesitated to follow the lead of psychiatrists in defining
the class of the irresponsible. For over a century they have
insisted on a test of responsibility which most analysts and
other psychiatrists regard as untenable and unworkable.
This is the traditional "right and wrong" test (the
M'Naghten test named for the celebrated English mur­
der case out of which it originated), under which evi­
dence of mental illness may be considered only if it es­
tablishes that the accused was unable to understand the
moral nature of his act. Psychoanalysts and others have
repeatedly criticized this formula because it apparently
holds responsible many criminals who are seriously ill
and who act compulsively despite an acute sense that
their conduct is "wrong."
In some American states the class of irresponsibles is
increased by recognition of an "irresistible impulse" de­
fense. In many states, however, judges have refused to
adopt this rule. Nor are they likely to be won over by the
psychoanalyst who argues that "every tenet of modern
psychiatry points toward the acceptance of the 'irresistible
impulse' plea" and at the same time insists that "modern
psychiatry ... regards all criminal acts as products of ab­
normal personality structure and development.'?" This,
in an article labeling free will an illusion, seems to sug­
gest that impulses which were not in fact resisted were
necessarily irresistible, a notion which can hardly be 111-
corporated into the criminal law.
Psychoanalysts and other psychiatrists have long in­
sisted that the "right and wrong" approach to criminal
responsibility should be abandoned. For example, the
British Institute of Psycho-Analysis recommended re­
cently that the law should hold not criminally responsible
a person suffering from "disorder of emotion such that he
did not possess sufficient power to prevent himself from
committing the act."ll In the United States a similar rec­
ommendation has been made by the Group for the Ad­
vancement of Psychiatry, an organization which includes
influential psychoanalysts. This recommendation is sim­
ply that "no person shall be convicted ... when at the
time he committed the act ... he was suffering from
mental illness." Mental illness is defined as "an illness
which so lessens the capacity of the person to use ... his
judgment, discretion and control in the conduct of his af­
fairs and social relations as to warrant his commitment to
a mental institution.t'l''
In July, 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reviewed these recommendations and, without
the aid of statute, adopted a new test: Did the defendant's
act stem from mental illness or defect, or was it the result
of an exercise of free will ?13 Judge Bazelon argued ex­
plicitly that, if free choice is involved, moral blame at­
taches and criminal responsibility is therefore imposed;
if the act is traceable to mental illness rather than to free
choice, criminal responsibility should not be imposed, be­
cause moral blame does not attach.
This reasoning raises 'anew the basic tension between
the traditions of law and psychoanalysis. What are the
possibilities of reducing this tension? I think the possibil­
ities are substantial. Lawyers and psychoanalysts can
achieve not only a working agreement but also common
insight as to the nature of man and common acceptance
of the paradox or mystery of his freedom.
In the first place, not all psychoanalysts and analytically
oriented psychiatrists are dogmatic in their total rejection
of free choice. The following quotation is from Dr. Stan­
ley A. Leavey, of the Yale School of Medicine:
Insofar as we approach the subject inductively we come
out with nothing but a deterministic view; causality is even
seen to reign within the moral life as it does elsewhere....
[But] only a prejudice would make us deny the reality of all
our choices. A scientific statement of the matter at this point
seems to me to be this: that we really have moral choices,
and that when we examine them, we find their determinants,
and these two clauses are not reducible to one another, i.e.,
the discovery of causality in human experience does not ex­
haust its meaning.l"
Another analyst who may be cited here is Dr. Robert
P. Knight, whose address on "Determinism, 'Freedom,'
and Psychotherapy"?" was a direct reply to the bar associ­
ation warning already referred to. In this address he dis­
cussed the necessity of effort on the part of a patient un­
dergoing psychotherapy. If therapy is to be successful,
must the patient exert effort and, if so, is the exertion
fully explained by tracing its appearance to existing char­
acter traits and to the new determinants brought to bear
by the therapist? Dr. Knight took a thoroughgoing de­
terminist position and yet insisted upon the necessity of
effort. After puzzling over this address for some time, I
wrote to Dr. Knight, asking whether there is not a para­
dox between determinism and the notion of "effort"
which patients (and everyone else) must make in order
to grow in responsibility. (I had laid a wager with one of
my colleagues that Dr. Knight would admit the existence
of paradox.) He replied as follows:
Yes, I puzzled quite a bit over the paradox of psychic de­
terminism vs. "effort," and have not yet reconciled it to my
satisfaction. One can say that the effort itself is also deter-
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mined-which seems to be something of a tour de force­
or one can concede that, especially in psychotherapy, one ex­
pects and mobilizes more effort than the amount which is
yet "determined" by previous experience. Such factors as
transference (in therapy), inspirational influences, and con­
ceptions of one's self or of one's completed work, projected
into the future, may be regarded as determining factors, but
I still, at this stage of my thinking at least, feel that there is
something left over. Harry Emerson Fosdick ... calls it a
"personal rejoinder" to life experience. I think you win your
bet.
One may even find a psychoanalyst saying a good word
for the idea of retribution and for traditional ideas of
morality. Dr. Robert Waelder, a graduate of the Vienna
Psychoanalytic Institute, has asserted that everyone, with­
out exception, believes that retribution should follow vio­
lation of law; he explains that the apparent opponents of
retribution merely hold that someone other than the
criminal is guilty of his act-"society," "the ruling class,"
etc.!" Dr. Waelder has also written:
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The complete elimination of the concept of retribution
from the legal system may not be without danger. It would
tend to dissociate the law entirely from moral sentiment. If
the law no longer must conform, by and large, to moral
standards, utilitarianism or expediency becomes the only
guide. The emancipation from traditional moral sentiments,
begun at first for humanitarian purposes, may eventually
have consequences not so humanitarian. Once everything can
be done that appears to be socially useful, i.e., that is so con­
sidered by those who have authority to define social useful­
ness, a course has been charted that may well end in despot­
ism. Liberal positivism, in its humanitarian distaste for the
harsher aspects of traditional morality, may, by undermining
the authority of traditional morality, become the pathbreaker
of more ruthless successors. The humanitarian goal ... seems
to me to be better served by the progressive mitigation of the
severity of retribution rather than by an attempt to eliminate
the retributive aspect altogetherP
Psychoanalysis is gradually developing a distinctive eth­
ical theory. It has its own conception of "the good," the
objective of healthy personality development. The vary­
ing formulations use terms such as "maturity," "sponta­
neity," "productiveness," "inner freedom," "responsibili­
ty," "capacity to love." Furthermore, some analysts, as we
have seen, are willing to concede that men have a degree
of freedom to move or not to move in the direction of
this goal. To be sure, this is no power to lift one's self
by his bootstraps. Progress toward maturity comes about
only with external help-help which ordinary experience
affords or help made available in psychotherapy. Man's
real freedom of choice is a freedom to accept or reject
such help, a freedom to choose among potential determi­
nants of one's conduct.
Acceptance of help means the acceptance of painful
self-knowledge (as well as other frustrations); it means
also the resisting of self-protective reaction tendencies.
This is the basic requirement for advance in maturity.
In the words of Dr. Ernest Jones, the English editor of
Freud:
The psychological problem of normality must ultimately
reside in the capacity to endure-in the ability to hold wishes
in suspension without either renouncing them or "reacting"
to them in defensive ways. Freedom and self-control are thus
seen to be really the same thing, though both are badly mis­
used concepts.l"
Of course one seldom finds psychoanalysts speaking of
moral duty, but even Dr. Alexander comes close in the
following passage:
Freud remarked once that one may postulate that man is
responsible even for his dreams, i.e., for his unconscious
wishes. When asked whether we must bear responsibility for
our dreams, Freud answered: "Who else can take over this
responsibility?" After all, an individual is closer to his own
unconscious than anyone else....
Psychoanalysis makes it possible for the individual to in­
crease the scope of power of his conscious Ego. . . . The
founder of psychoanalysis has thus a right to impose on us
the responsibility for the unconscious because he made it pos­
sible for man to gain the upper hand over [it].19
In the foregoing pages are fragmentary materials for a
psychoanalytic ethics. Can such a position be satisfactory
to the lawyer? He has usually affirmed a freedom of
choice far wider than that which any analyst is willing
to recognize. Can he admit that this wider freedom is a
fiction? He may have heard of the "philosophy of 'as
if,' "20 and he may recall that careful judges have some­
times spoken of free will as only an assumption. Thus
Mr. Justice Jackson:
How far one by an exercise of free will may determine his
general destiny or his course in a particular matter and how
far he is the toy of circumstance has been debated through
the ages by theologians, philosophers, and scientists. What­
ever doubts they have entertained as to the matter, the prac­
tical business of government and administration of the law
is obliged to proceed on more or less rough and ready judg­
ments based on the assumption that mature and rational per­
sons are in control of their own conduct.P
What may trouble the lawyer is the realization that legal
responsibility is thus revealed as largely vicarious respon­
sibility. To be sure, the law has had its categories of lia­
bility without fault; employers are vicariously responsible
for acts of their employees. But it is usually assumed that
such instances of liability are exceptional and require spe­
cial justification. And it is also believed that in criminal
law vicarious liability is even more strictly limited. Now
the lawyer is told that the typical liability for "fault,"
criminal as well as civil, is largely vicarious, since it is lia­
bility for consequences of the acts of others who have
molded the defendant's character and determined his
conduct.
If the lawyer explores this view of responsibility, he
may discover that it is by no means novel. It is a central
theme in the Judeo-Christian tradition of moral theology.
In this tradition there is no impairment of the sense of
responsibility if one recognizes the extent to which one's
character and therefore one's acts are determined by the
acts of one's forebears and others. Men are called to as­
sume responsibility for themselves and for their acts re­
gardless of the determinants of those acts. God imposes
this responsibility, and his grace makes it possible for
man to shoulder it, to make something of himself. The
key to personality development is the acceptance of this
vicarious responsibiilty-in Christian terms it is partici­
pation in the atoning life of the Savior. In the words of
Sir Walter Moberly:
It may be [that it is] by the acceptance of a moral liability
greater than appears to be due that moral advance is
made....
... we are forced to widen our conception of responsibil­
ity. It no longer appears simply a liability arising out of a
power. It may also be a power arising out of a voluntary,
and apparently quixotic, embracing of a liability that could
have been disputed.F
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It is not essential, of course, that the lawyer and the
psychoanalyst reach agreement on metaphysical terms in
which to couch the mystery of human freedom. If only
they mutually acknowledge the existence of the mystery,
they can join wholeheartedly in a working agreement.
They can agree that the purposes of the criminal law are
forward-looking, that the legal process is impotent to un­
cover and adjudicate man's real freedom and responsi­
bility. The law must summon men to full responsibility
and to this end must treat most men as if they were fully
responsible. (In this sense only is legal justice retribu­
tive.) Legal liability is both necessary and helpful in en­
abling men to increase in self-control. But it is only the
relatively healthy whom it is appropriate to treat in this
manner. The drawing of the line will remain a difficult
task. And it will be unfortunate and unnecessary if mu­
tual distrust keeps lawyers and psychiatrists from co-oper­
ative attack upon this problem.
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A portion of the manorial rolls involved in the Great Tey
case, now on exhibition in the Law Library.
Manorial Rolls and Captain Clark
A manorial roll which was among those involved in the
Great Tey case (Beaumont v. Jeffrey, L.R. (1925) Ch.1;
93 L.J. (Ch.) 532; 40 T.L.R. 796; 132 L.T. 246) is cur­
rently on display in the Reading Room of the Law Li­
brary. The roll dates from the 37th year of the reign of
Henry VIII; it is in excellent condition and presents a
fine example of the calligrapher's art. On display with
the manorial roll are papers summarizing current litiga­
tion between the Minnesota Historical Society and the
United States, concerning ownership of field notes from
the "Lewis and Clark Expedition." The holding in the
Great Tey case, which was a suit in detinue by the lord
of the manor of Great Tey to recover possession of cer­
tain manorial rolls, seems pertinent to the current con­
troversy.
That case seems to stand for the principle that original
records of legal and historical interest may be sold by
their initial owner, but that all purchasers assume an ob­
ligation to make the records available to anyone whose
rights may be affected by their contents.
Litigation over the field notes of Captain Clark of the
"Lewis and Clark Expedition" is now in process in the
federal courts. The notes were discovered in 1952 among
the papers of the late General John Hammond; the
papers were at that time stored in the home of his daugh­
ter. The executors of the daughter's estate brought suit
to quiet title, naming as defendants the daughter's heirs,
and also the other children of General Hammond, who
claimed the papers as part of the estate of their mother.
Other defendants are John Doe and Jane Roe to cover
any possible heirs of Captain Clark, and the Minnesota
Historical Society, which has possession of the papers as
bailee of the executors. The United States Government
intervened, claiming title on the ground that the notes
are "contemporary original records of the so-called 'Lew­
is and Clark Expedition.'
"
The concern of archivists, librarians, and other collec­
tors of historical papers is over the possible precedent
which might result from the Government's success,
throwing into doubt title to many highly prized items.
The National Archives has stated that Government in­
tervention was prompted only by the fear that if the
documents remained in private hands they would not
be available to all persons interested in them.
